Seven ways to stay in touch
Compare private messengers
Iris Chat, White Noise, Signal, Matrix, Session, Telegram, and Keet take different approaches to private messaging. Here is what changes when you choose one.
The differences at a glance
End-to-end encryption protects message contents. Metadata can still reveal who talks to whom, which messages belong to one group, and when people connect.
Scroll sideways to compare all seven. The feature names stay in view.
| What matters | Iris Chat [1] | White Noise [2] | Signal [3] | Matrix [4] | Session [5] | Telegram [6] | Keet [7] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Identity | Local keys. No provider account, phone number, or email. | Nostr keys. No phone number or email. | Signal account. Phone signup, or paid numberless signup in the Android beta. | Account on a homeserver. Signup requirements depend on the provider. | Locally generated Account ID. No phone number or email. | Telegram account with a number. A SIM-free number is an option. | Local identity. No signup, phone number, or email. |
| Messaging network | Choose Nostr relays, including your own. Nearby connections also work. | Choose Nostr relays, including your own. | Signal’s service. A proxy helps reach it; it does not replace it. | Federated homeservers. Choose a provider or run your own. | Session’s onion-routed network and assigned storage nodes. | Telegram’s service. No independent message servers. | Peer-to-peer over Pear. Blind peers can retain encrypted copies. |
| Direct messages | End-to-end encrypted by default. | End-to-end encrypted by default, using Marmot / MLS. | End-to-end encrypted by default. | End-to-end encryption in encrypted rooms. Check the client and room settings. | End-to-end encrypted by default. | Only Secret Chats are end-to-end encrypted. Ordinary cloud chats are not. | End-to-end encrypted. |
| Group messages | End-to-end encrypted. Separate ratchet envelopes for each recipient. | End-to-end encrypted using Marmot / MLS. | End-to-end encrypted. | End-to-end encryption in encrypted rooms; public rooms may be unencrypted. | Private groups are end-to-end encrypted. Public communities are not. | Not end-to-end encrypted. | End-to-end encrypted rooms. |
| Metadata privacy | No shared group ID or member list in public relay fields. Separate recipient envelopes; routing tags, sizes, and timing remain visible. | Fresh signing keys hide account identities in group events. A shared, rotatable group ID links messages and subscriptions. | Sealed sender hides the sender where used; private groups hide membership from the service. Delivery destinations remain visible. | Participating homeservers see room IDs, membership, senders, and timestamps, even in encrypted rooms. | Onion routing separates your IP from the destination. Storage nodes still handle account or group mailboxes and message timing. | The service handles account and conversation metadata. Secret Chats do not make the service unaware of the participants. | No central chat server. Blind peers cannot read messages or names; room peers can observe connections. |
| IP privacy while messaging | Relays can observe your IP address and timing. | Relays can observe your IP address and timing. | Sealed sender reduces sender metadata; it does not itself hide your IP address. | Your homeserver can observe your connection. Room metadata is shared across participating servers. | Onion routing hides your IP from message storage nodes. Entry nodes still see your connection. | The service can observe your IP address. | Other peers may see your IP address. Keet recommends a VPN if needed. |
| When a recipient is offline | Relays can retain encrypted messages for later retrieval. | Relays store and forward encrypted events; retention varies. | The service queues encrypted messages for delivery. | Homeservers retain room history for later sync. | Storage nodes temporarily retain encrypted messages. | Cloud history stays on Telegram’s servers. Secret Chats remain device-specific. | Sync from reachable peers, including blind peers holding encrypted copies. |
Matrix is a protocol; client and homeserver choices matter. Offline recipients and no internet are different situations. Iris also supports nearby messaging over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi/LAN, subject to device support and permissions. A local connection cannot reach a distant contact by itself.
Iris Chat & White Noise
Both use Nostr relays and let you control your identity keys. Iris uses double-ratchet sessions and delivers group messages inside separate encrypted envelopes for each recipient. White Noise uses Marmot, built on Messaging Layer Security (MLS), with shared group state for membership and key changes.
Marmot uses a fresh signing key for each group event, keeping the sender’s account identity out of that event. Messages and subscriptions still carry a shared public group identifier. It can rotate, but while an identifier is in use, a relay can link that group’s traffic and the connections following it. The identifier alone does not reveal members’ account identities. Iris does not publish a shared group identifier or member list; connection information and timing can still reveal patterns in either app.
Iris Chat & Session
Session’s built-in onion routing is a meaningful difference for network privacy. Its open-source desktop app builds multi-hop onion requests and uses storage nodes to keep messages available while recipients are away. Iris gives you a choice of Nostr relays and nearby transports, but does not promise IP anonymity.
Session’s current protocol uses long-term account keys. Its planned Protocol V2 adds forward secrecy and post-quantum encryption. Iris’s direct chats use a double ratchet; group key recovery has different tradeoffs. See Iris’s protocol guarantees and limits.
Iris Chat & Signal
Signal provides encrypted direct chats, groups, and calls through its own service. Its paid numberless signup is currently documented for the Android beta; usernames can also keep a registered phone number private from contacts. Iris identities are independent of a messaging provider.
A related double-ratchet design does not give Iris the same implementation or security review as Signal. Read Iris’s security guide.
Iris Chat & Matrix
Matrix is an open protocol used by clients such as Element. It offers federated rooms, communities, and bridges. You can run a homeserver, but your account’s ID includes that server’s domain. Iris keys are independent of a particular relay.
Matrix encryption depends on the room and client. Check that a room is encrypted; a bridge or bot that receives plaintext adds another party to trust.
Iris Chat & Telegram
Telegram offers large groups, channels, bots, and cloud history. Its ordinary direct and group text chats are not end-to-end encrypted. Secret Chats add end-to-end encryption for one-to-one conversations on their original devices. Iris encrypts direct and group chats by default.
Iris Chat & Keet
Keet uses peer-to-peer connections for encrypted chat, calls, and file sharing. Its blind peers keep encrypted room copies available without the keys to read them, helping members catch up at different times. Delivery still needs a reachable peer with the data.
Peer-to-peer does not mean anonymous: Keet’s privacy FAQ says other peers may see your IP address. Iris’s relays can observe connection information too.
Try it with one person first.
Choose based on the people you need to reach, the infrastructure you want to use, and the privacy properties that matter to you. Check delivery, notifications, and linked devices in your normal routine.
Try Iris ChatSources and scope
Written by Iris Chat. Metadata privacy was reviewed on 22 October 2026; the other entries were reviewed on 20 October 2026, including Session Desktop v1.18.2’s routing and message-encryption code. The metadata row describes what delivery infrastructure can observe, not just what it says it retains. Keet’s entry is limited to its published documentation. This is not an independent security audit. Calls, push notifications, and public profiles can have different privacy properties.
- Iris Chat: Features and platform status · Identity and server settings · Protocol and metadata limits · Current native app source and transport privacy checks
- White Noise: Identity, relays, encryption, and delivery · Group tags and fresh event keys · Group identifier rotation · Group subscription source
- Signal: Numberless Android beta signup · Usernames · Encryption · Offline message queues · Sealed sender and metadata · Private group membership · Service model
- Matrix: Accounts, homeservers, and federation · Room encryption · Encrypted events and visible metadata · Client and provider choices
- Session: Identity, groups, onion routing, and storage · Protocol V2 plans · Onion-routing source · Message-encryption source
- Telegram: FAQ: cloud chats, Secret Chats, groups, and servers · IP addresses and cloud storage · SIM-free signup
- Keet: Identity, encryption, and Pear · Peer IP visibility · Offline availability and blind peering